The map — who is who
M5 — The industry & the firms
The course has spent five modules on markets. This one is about the people in them: what the major firms actually do, how they make money, and how they are paid.
The single most useful organising question is not what a firm trades. It is:
Where does the money come from?
Answer that and almost everything else about a firm — its risk appetite, its size, its secrecy, how it pays people, whether it wants your money — follows.
A note on these facts before you rely on them
This module is different from M1–M4 in one important respect, and it is worth stating up front rather than in a footnote.
Everything so far was verifiable: order-book mechanics, derivations you can check, market data you can download. This module is largely about private companies that do not publish figures. Headcounts, revenues, assets under management and pay are reported second-hand, are frequently stale, and are sometimes strategically leaked.
So: the structures here are durable and worth learning. The numbers are approximate, dated to 2026, and will drift. Where a hard figure appears it is either from an audited public filing — Virtu in M5.2 is the one genuinely open window — or explicitly flagged as a reported estimate. Treat any specific number in this module as an order of magnitude, and check it before you quote it to anyone.
The four revenue models
who pays them for what so they optimise
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MARKET MAKERS
the market itself the spread, earned on VOLUME and
(no outside investors) enormous volume VOLATILITY
ASSET MANAGERS
investors a % of assets held ASSET GATHERING
(management fee) and not being fired
HEDGE FUNDS
investors a % of assets PLUS a share RETURNS
of profits (and keeping capital)
BANKS (sell side)
clients commissions, spreads, CLIENT FLOW
fees for intermediation and balance sheet
Those incentives are not cynical readings; they are the design. An asset manager charging 0.05% on an index fund genuinely should be maximising assets, because that is the service. A hedge fund charging 20% of profits genuinely should be maximising returns. Problems arise when the incentive and the marketing diverge — which is most of what M5.5 is about.
Sell side and buy side
The oldest division in the industry, and the vocabulary is used constantly:
SELL SIDE BUY SIDE
banks, brokers, dealers funds, asset managers, pensions
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intermediate: make markets, take positions with capital they
execute, research, underwrite own or manage
paid by clients, per trade paid on assets and performance
Goldman, JPM, Morgan Stanley Millennium, Fidelity, CalPERS
The names are historical — the sell side "sells" securities and services to the buy side, which "buys" them. Market makers sit awkwardly across the line: structurally sell-side (they intermediate, they provide liquidity) but organised like the buy side (proprietary capital, no clients, performance-driven pay).
The three models this module distinguishes
The roadmap's self-assessment asks you to tell three apart. Here they are side by side; the next three lessons take one each.
MARKET MAKER POD SHOP SINGLE-STRATEGY
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e.g. Jane Street, Millennium, Renaissance,
Citadel Securities Citadel, Point72 AQR, Bridgewater
edge immediacy — being MANY uncorrelated one deep edge,
fastest and tightest small edges, run applied at scale
at huge volume by separate teams
capital own money investors' money, investors' money
allocated to pods
holding seconds to hours days to months days to years
period
what kills it a bad regime, a correlated pods, the edge decaying,
technology failure crowded unwind or capacity
risk model get flat, fast hard stop-losses portfolio-level
per pod
scales with volume + volatility HEADCOUNT the edge's capacity
(hire more pods) (usually limited)
The row that most repays attention is the last one. A market maker grows by trading more volume; a pod shop grows by hiring more teams; a single-strategy fund often cannot grow at all, because its edge has a capacity limit — precisely the Q^1.5 cost scaling of M1.5 and M2.7. That one difference explains why some of the best-performing funds in history are closed to new money while some mediocre ones manage hundreds of billions.
Where the earlier modules land
Everything in M0–M4 was describing the environment these firms operate in:
M0.4 the spread → what a market maker earns (M5.2)
M1.2 adverse selection → what it costs them (M5.2)
M1.7 the maker's edge → their P&L, as an equation (M5.2)
M1.5 impact and capacity → why fund size is capped (M5.4)
M2.7 multiple testing → why most "edges" aren't (M5.4)
M3.6 drawdown, not variance → why pods have stop-losses (M5.3)
M4.6 regime change → what ends a strategy (M5.3)
You already know how these businesses work. M5 is mostly putting names to them.
Source: the roadmap’s picks are podcasts rather than books, deliberately — Odd Lots (Bloomberg) and Flirting with Models (Corey Hoffstein) are where practitioners explain their own business models in their own words, which no textbook does. Start with any Odd Lots episode featuring a market maker.